The Cost of Delaying Approval of Golden Rice by Wesseler, J.H.H. et al.
Also in this issue
ARE Faculty Profile:  
Dalia Ghanem................................4
Managing International 
Migration in the Americas 
Philip Martin....................................5
Buffer Zone Regulations and 
Alternatives to Pre-plant Soil 
Fumigation: Using Steam 
in California Strawberry 
Production 
Yan Xu, Steven A. Fennimore, 
Rachael E. Goodhue, Karen M. 
Klonsky, and Thomas Miller.........9
V. 17 no. 3 • Jan/Feb 2014
Between 250,000 and 500,000 children go blind every year because of Vitamin A deficiency, 
and more than half die within a year 
of becoming blind. A total of 125 mil-
lion children under the age of five suffer 
from Vitamin A deficiency, which has 
resulted in increased vulnerability to 
consumption of Golden Rice can lower 
the risk of Vitamin A deficiency.
Another criticism was that Vitamin 
A deficiency could be avoided by dis-
tributing supplements to the poor, is 
a nice idea in theory, but has not been 
put into action. Likely, the real con-
cern of opponents was that Golden 
Rice would act as a “Trojan Horse” that 
would lead to large-scale expansion of 
the adoption of genetically engineered 
(GE) food in developing countries. 
The proof of concept of Golden 
Rice has existed since the late 1990s, 
and it was expected that the first com-
mercial variety would be available in 
2002. In 2000 a public-private partner-
ship started between the Golden Rice 
Humanitarian Project and the Syngenta 
Corporation that aimed to pass the 
regulatory approval process and bring 
the product to market. However, the 
regulatory bodies in India and Ban-
gladesh have not approved thus far, 
even though there is a large body of 
evidence that suggests Golden Rice 
and other GE varieties do not produce 
greater health or environmental risks 
than non-GE varieties, clearly the pri-
mary reason for the delayed decision is 
objection from environmental groups.
Assessing the Impact of Delaying 
the Approval of Golden Rice
To assess the economics of regulating 
Golden Rice, we quantified the logic of 
the regulatory process. A regulator can 
approve the use of a new technology, 
ban it, or delay the decision in order 
to obtain new information. In the case 
of Golden Rice, regulators in countries 
The Cost of Delaying Approval of Golden Rice
Justus Wesseler, Scott Kaplan, and David Zilberman
More than   250,000   children go 
blind every year because of Vitamin 
A deficiency. Vitamin A intake can 
be enhanced by consuming Golden 
Rice—a genetically engineered 
variety of rice. It was available for 
commercialization in 2002, but 
approval has been delayed. We 
estimate that this delay has resulted 
in 600,000 to 1.2 million additional 
cases of blindness.
common childhood infections, higher 
likelihood of anemia, and poor growth.
There is sufficient evidence that peo-
ple who suffer from these nutritional 
deficiencies are much less productive, 
more likely to remain poor, and die 
young. Many of the people who suffer 
from Vitamin A deficiency subsist on 
rice as a staple food. Rice produces beta-
carotene that contains Vitamin A. 
However, it remains in the leaf and is 
not found in the grain people consume. 
One avenue to address Vitamin A defi-
ciency is to add Vitamin A to rice, which 
is the idea behind Golden Rice. 
By taking advantage of our better 
understanding of the genome of rice, and 
inserting only two genes into the genome 
of rice, which contains a total of 37,544 
genes, a modified variety called Golden 
Rice was introduced. The more “golden” 
the rice is, the higher the concentration 
of beta-carotene, and since the prototype 
was developed in 1999, improved lines 
of Golden Rice have been generated. 
The objective is to reach the recom-
mended daily allowance of Vitamin A 
by consuming 100-200 grams of rice 
containing beta-carotene. A recent study 
found that a daily intake of 60 grams 
(one-half cup) of Golden Rice is suffi-
cient in preventing Vitamin A malnutri-
tion. From its inception, the technol-
ogy has encountered major objections, 
mostly from environmental groups. In 
early versions of Golden Rice, there 
was a concern that it required a large 
intake of rice to meet daily allowances. 
However, over time the concentration 
of Vitamin A in Golden Rice increased 
substantially, and relatively modest 
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where Vitamin A deficiency is a major 
problem (e.g., India and Bangladesh) 
have decided to delay the choice. 
The rationale for such a decision is 
that the gains from improved knowl-
edge through delay are greater than the 
cost of the delay. The benefit from delay 
is the perceived cost of uncertainty 
about the outcome of a technology that 
may be reduced by delaying approval. 
In the case of a regulatory decision, this 
perceived cost quantifies the magnitude 
of the political pressure by people op-
posing the technology.
The costs of delay are the net ben-
efits from adoption of Golden Rice 
that are lost. These net benefits are 
the sum of the discounted net ben-
efits of reduced incidents of Vitamin 
A deficiency-induced health problems 
minus the cost of the introduction 
and adoption of the technology. 
To derive the foregone benefit, had 
Golden Rice been adopted in India in 
2002, we assume a gradual adoption of 
Golden Rice and estimate that the overall 
adoption would be around 30%, which 
is modest. The unit of measurement of 
foregone benefit is the disability-adjusted 
life year (DALY). These disabilities 
include blindness, measles, and mortal-
ity of children and pregnant women.
We estimated the number of DALYs 
lost because of the lack of availability of 
Golden Rice since 2002 to be between 
1.4 and 2 million. We assume a very 
low value of a DALY (USD $500) in our 
initial calculation. The cost of the intro-
duction of Golden Rice includes main-
tenance and breeding as well as social 
marketing of the new variety, which 
are much smaller than the benefit from 
improved health because of Golden Rice.
Based on these conservative assump-
tions, we estimated that the net present 
value of a 10-year delay in the introduc-
tion of Golden Rice to be USD $707 
million. Note that $500 per DALY is a 
very conservative assumption. In the 
United States, it may be something like 
USD $20,000 or higher. If we increase 
the DALY to USD $2,000, the net loss 
is approximately four times as high. 
The delay of approval by more 
than 10 years reflects that the cost of 
the various perceived risks associated 
with the introduction of Golden Rice 
is greater than the perceived benefits 
by a significant amount. Our calcula-
tion of these accumulated perceived 
risk costs estimates them to be at least 
USD $1.7 billion since 2002. The annual 
perceived cost of risk associated with 
the adoption of Golden Rice in India, 
alone, is estimated to be USD $199 mil-
lion. The transition from annual cost 
was calculated based on a discount-
ing factor that took into account the 
uncertainty about the magnitude of the 
risk. These estimated perceived costs 
of introduction provide an economic 
rationale for the delay. Of course, much 
of these costs really reflect the politi-
cal pressure against its adoption. 
An alternative approach to assess 
the policy-making process is to recog-
nize that every year, between 250,000 
and 500,000 children go blind, and 
in India alone, more than 70,000 die 
because of Vitamin A deficiency. If 
we assume global adoption of 20%, 
from 2002 until today, we could have 
prevented 600,000 to 1.2 million 
cases of blindness, and in India alone, 
about 180,000 deaths of children.
The Perceived Cost of Golden Rice
Whether viewed in monetary terms 
or the costs of blindness and death 
avoided, the delay of the introduc-
tion of Golden Rice was very costly. 
We know that the scientists fight-
ing river blindness, a disease that 
affects millions of people and blinds 
about 300,000 in Africa, are justifi-
ably treated like heroes. Thus, the 
perceived costs of Golden Rice must 
be very high to delay its introduction. 
But where are these costs coming 
from? A 2012 publication of Green-
peace titled “Golden Illusion: The 
Broken Promises of ‘Golden’ Rice,” 
states: “if introduced on a large scale, 
golden rice can exacerbate malnutri-
tion and ultimately undermine food 
security.” The concern is that Golden 
Rice may accelerate the adoption of 
other GE crops in developing coun-
tries, which is perceived by Greenpeace 
and others to be very dangerous.
However, the reality is quite different. 
A growing, large body of literature in-
dicates that GE varieties have produced 
a significant amount of real benefit 
throughout the world, and its curtail-
ment is a source of potential social loss.
Agricultural biotechnology applies 
the tools of modern biology to agricul-
tural production. Genetic engineering 
Figure 1. A Decade of Regulatory Hurdles for Golden Rice
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has been a crucial element in develop-
ing medicine that is based on better 
understanding of biological processes, 
and is serving the same role in agricul-
ture. For years, we have been modify-
ing varieties by crop breeding, but GE 
technology increases precision and 
enables altering only a few genes. 
Because of strict regulation, the adop-
tion of GE has been limited. GE varieties 
have been introduced in corn, soybean, 
and canola mostly in the U.S., Canada, 
Brazil and Argentina, and to a large 
extent with cotton. There is significant 
adoption of GE varieties in papaya, and 
some application in rice and tobacco. 
Even though GE has been introduced 
in few crops, its impact on agricultural 
production is immense because it has 
increased productivity substantially. 
Furthermore, its impact on productiv-
ity has been higher in developing versus 
developed countries. Because of lim-
ited adoption in most of these regions, 
its potential has not been realized.
Without adoption of GE, soybean 
prices are estimated to have been 33% 
higher and corn prices 13% higher. Even 
though these crops are used to sup-
port livestock, the poor are consumers 
of meats, and they are affected signifi-
cantly when there are food shortages. 
The food crisis of 2008 is a good 
indicator of the consequences of high 
food prices. Without the contribu-
tion of GE varieties, we would see 
much more frequent food shortages. 
Our research suggests that if GE was 
adopted by European and African coun-
tries and introduced in grains, food 
prices would decline much more sub-
stantially, and the land footprint (total 
land acreage in production) would 
decline because of higher yields. 
The higher yields associated with GE 
varieties have a significant positive envi-
ronmental effect because of the reduc-
tion in use of fertilizer, water, and energy 
in agriculture. Some of the land-saving 
effect is because of the ability to use 
double-cropping to produce soybeans. 
GE also benefits the environment 
because it allows certain toxic chemicals 
to be replaced, and there is evidence that 
it has already saved lives in develop-
ing countries. Of course, it encounters 
some problems with pest resistance and 
changes in use of herbicide, but the over-
all environmental effect is quite positive. 
Because GE provides a powerful mecha-
nism to develop new varieties in a sys-
tematic manner, it can play an important 
role in providing strategies to adapt to 
climate change, which can significantly 
benefit developing countries that may 
face some of its most dire consequences.
GE was introduced in cotton in 
India in 2002, and has been adopted 
by over 90% of cotton farmers. As we 
know, adoption of technologies in 
India and other developing countries 
tends to be slow, and the high rate of 
adoption is one indicator that farm-
ers perceive it to be beneficial. Studies 
have shown that farmers, including very 
poor ones, gain a significant share of 
the benefit as a result of high aggregate 
adoption. In some cases, it increases 
their income by 50% or even more. 
The drastic increase in cotton 
yield because of GE increased the 
Indian share in world cotton produc-
tion and benefitted its economy. The 
high rate of adoption of GE cotton 
and other varieties (when avail-
able) in India and other develop-
ing countries suggests that if Golden 
Rice would have been introduced, it 
would have been widely adopted. 
If Golden Rice had been adopted, it 
might have led to further acceptance 
of GE technology and adoption of 
other traits in rice. While some groups 
may be concerned about it, based on 
evidence from China and the cases 
of cotton and corn, it seems that GE 
would increase the productivity of 
the rice sector and free up land and 
other resources for alternative uses.
Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that the delayed 
introduction of Golden Rice for over 
a decade has been very costly both in 
monetary terms as well as the hundreds 
of thousands of cases of blindness and 
child deaths. Political pressure by oppo-
nents to GE technology is likely to be 
one of the main causes for this delay. 
The irony of the situation was not lost 
on some of the individuals who opposed 
GE technologies. For example, Patrick 
Moore, one of the co-founders of Green-
peace, recognized that the poor have 
paid the majority of the price of the fight 
against GE technologies, and founded an 
organization called the “Allow Golden 
Rice Society.” Golden Rice is an extreme 
case that illustrates global social loss 
from the heavy regulation of GE tech-
nology, and reevaluation of policies 
assessing these technologies is needed.
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ARE Faculty Profile: Dalia Ghanem
Dalia Ghanem has recently joined the faculty at the Uni-versity of California, Davis as 
an assistant professor in the Depart-
ment of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ARE). Her fields of interest 
are econometrics and environmental 
economics. Her work in economet-
rics is focused on improving existing 
methods for using longitudinal or 
panel data for economic and policy 
analysis. Her environmental research 
examines air pollution in China.
Dalia’s country of origin is Egypt. 
She grew up in Alexandria, where she 
attended the German School in Alexan-
dria. She received her B.A. in Econom-
ics and Political Science at the Ameri-
can University in Cairo (AUC). At 
AUC, Dalia volunteered for an interna-
tional human rights lawyer and thought 
that she would pursue a career in that 
field, until she took her first course of 
econometrics. She simply got “hooked” 
and decided that a Ph.D. in economet-
rics was the right dream to pursue.
Before embarking on her journey 
to pursue a career in academia, Dalia 
first worked as a research analyst at the 
Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, 
a think-tank in Egypt. She also worked 
as a special assistant to Egypt’s former 
minister of trade and industry, Rachid 
M. Rachid. These experiences still 
inspire how she sees her role as an aca-
demic in the “greater scheme of things.” 
The Ph.D. journey started with 
an M.Sc. in Econometrics at London 
School of Economics, followed by a 
Ph.D. in Economics at the University 
of California, San Diego, which she 
completed in June 2013. Her disserta-
tion examined identification and esti-
mation issues in nonlinear panel data 
models. Panel data are becoming widely 
available in many fields, including 
ARE. They allow empirical research-
ers to identify the effects of policies or 
changes in economic conditions on dif-
ferent states, firms, farms, or individu-
als. Since we usually lack experimental 
control in many policy settings, we 
worry about unobservable heterogene-
ity in our data that may confound our 
effect of interest. In the main chapter 
of Dalia’s dissertation, she examines 
this identification question thoroughly 
and provides the empirical researcher 
with ways to test for whether his or her 
data can identify the effect of interest. 
In another chapter of her disserta-
tion (co-authored with Junjie Zhang), 
she applies the tests developed in her 
main dissertation chapter to examine 
the manipulation of air pollution data 
by Chinese cities. The Chinese central 
government has been monitoring air 
pollution of over 100 Chinese cities 
since 2001. Chinese local governments 
have been required to report their air 
pollution index (API) on a daily basis. 
This self-reported data enters the per-
formance evaluation of local officials. 
Dalia and her co-author examine the 
incentive for manipulation in such a 
policy environment. They find evidence 
of manipulation for about half of the 
cities in their sample. Their results indi-
cate that manipulation is more likely to 
occur on days where visibility is high 
and wind speed is low. It is intuitive 
that these conditions would be condu-
cive to manipulation, since it is hard 
to be suspicious of a good API score 
when visibility is high. In addition, 
when wind speed is low, the pollutants 
are not simply “gone with the wind.”
Currently, Dalia is continuing 
her empirical work on issues related 
to air pollution in China. She is col-
laborating with UC Davis professors 
Colin Carter and Shu Shen. Her cur-
rent econometrics projects include 
developing new methods to measure 
the degree of data manipulation. She 
is also working on improving exist-
ing methods for inference in nonlinear 
panel data models. Next spring, she 
will be teaching econometrics to the 
first-year Ph.D. students, where she 
hopes to inspire them to learn and use 
state-of-the-art quantitative methods.
In her free time, she loves spend-
ing time with her husband, Sean Rior-
dan, and their son, Fareed. They love 
going to the countless Davis parks, 
the rock-climbing gym, and the Davis 
Farmer’s market, where Fareed rides 
the bicycle-powered carousel. On 
weekends, they enjoy exploring Sac-
ramento and the Bay Area. They also 
love traveling to San Diego and Alex-
andria to visit family and friends.
Dalia Ghanem 
Assistant Professor 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 
University of California, Davis
Dalia Gahnem can be reached by email at 
dghanem@ucdavis.edu.
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The number of international migrants more than doubled between 1980 and 2010, from 103 
million to 214 million, and the stock is 
projected to continue rising faster than 
population, doubling to over 400 million 
in 2050. Each international migrant is 
unique, and each migration corridor has 
unique features, but there are four major 
migration flows, often summarized as 
S-S, S-N, N-N, and N-S (Table 1):
•	South-South: The largest flow of 
migrants, 74 million or 34% in 2010, 
moved from one developing country 
to another, as from Indonesia to Saudi 
Arabia or Nicaragua to Costa Rica.
•	South-North: The second-largest 
flow, 73 million or 34%, moved 
from a developing to an industrial 
or more-developed country, as from 
Morocco to Spain, Mexico to the U.S., 
or the Philippines to South Korea; 
one-third of international migration 
involves south-north movement.
•	North-North: Some 55 million people, 
or 26% of international migrants, 
moved from one industrial country to 
another, as from Canada to the U.S. 
•	North-South: Over 13 million 
people, or 6% of migrants, moved 
from industrial to developing 
countries, as with Japanese who 
work or retire in Thailand.
Most of the world’s countries par-
ticipate in the international migration 
system as countries of origin, transit, or 
destination, and many participate in all 
three phases of international migration. 
This article explains why people 
cross national borders, the effects of 
international migration on sending and 
receiving countries, and the struggle 
to improve migration management in 
North America, Europe, and Asia.
Migration, Inequalities,  
and Revolutions
Migration is the movement of people 
from one place to another. Migration 
is as old as humankind wandering 
in search of food, but international 
migration across defined and policed 
national borders is a relatively recent 
development. It was only in the early 
20th century that nation-states devel-
oped passports and visas to regulate the 
flow of people across their borders. 
International migration is the excep-
tion, not the rule. The number-one 
form of migration control is iner-
tia—most people do not want to move 
away from family and friends. Second, 
governments have significant capac-
ity to regulate migration, and they do, 
as evidenced by long lines of people 
outside consulates seeking visas and 
large agencies that patrol borders and 
check on foreigners inside countries. 
International migration is likely to 
increase with globalization and the cre-
ation of new nation-states. There were 
193 generally recognized nation-states in 
2000, four times more than the 43 in 
1900. 
The major reasons to expect more 
international migration are two inequali-
ties coupled with three revolutions. 
The demographic inequality is simple: 
almost all population growth occurs in 
the world’s 170 poorer countries, while 
the population of the 30 richer coun-
tries is expected to remain at 1.2 billion 
through 2050. The economic inequal-
ity is also straightforward. Worldwide 
GDP was $62 trillion in 2010, an aver-
age $9,000 per person a year. The 30 
high-income countries had a sixth of 
the world’s people but two-thirds of 
the world’s economic output—an aver-
age $39,000 per person per year—ten 
times more than the $3,800 average in 
the poorer 170 countries. Many young 
people are motivated to try to cross 
national borders to earn ten times more.
Demographic and economic inequali-
ties are like battery poles, providing 
the potential for migration but not 
necessarily laying out a path for people 
to cross borders. Migration bridges 
or networks connect the demand-
pull factors that attract migrants with 
the supply-push factors that moti-
vate migration, and they have been 
Managing International Migration in the Americas
Philip Martin
The number of international migrants, 
defined as persons outside their country 
of birth at least a year, reached 232 
million in 2013, making 3.2% of the 
world’s people international migrants. 
The United States is debating what to 
do about 11–12 million unauthorized 
foreigners, Canada is modifying its 
point-selection system to reduce brain 
waste, and some Latin American 
countries are attracting home citizens 
who emigrated.
Destination
Origin Industrial Developing Total
----------------millions--------------
Industrial 55 13 68
Developing 73 74 147
Total 128 87 215
------------percent of total-----------
Industrial 26% 6% 32%
Developing 34% 34% 68%
Total 60% 40% 100%
Table 1. International Migrants in 2010 
Source: UN Population Division. 2010. International Migration Report. http://esa.un.org/migration/
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enlarged by revolutions in communi-
cations, transportation, and rights.
The communications revolution 
highlights the ease with which infor-
mation flows over national borders. 
In the mid-19th century, when lit-
eracy rates in rural areas were often 
low, the so-called American letters 
sent to friends and relatives in Europe 
describing opportunities took weeks or 
months to arrive, and then the recipi-
ent would have to find someone literate 
to read the letter and draft a response. 
Today, mobile phones and the inter-
net transfer information much faster 
and cheaper over national borders. 
The transportation revolution refers 
to the ever-lower cost of travel. In the 
mid-18th century, many migrants to what 
became the U.S. could not afford the 
one-way fare, so they signed indentured-
servant contracts that obliged them to 
work four to six years for whoever met 
the ship and paid the captain. Today, 
the one-way cost of traveling legally to 
almost anywhere in the world is less 
than $3,000, and even migrants who 
pay smugglers $20,000 or more to get 
into higher-wage countries can usually 
repay this cost in less than two years. 
The rights revolution refers to 
the expansion of political, social, 
and economic rights in most coun-
tries over the past half-century. UN 
human rights conventions grant basic 
civic rights to all persons, labor con-
ventions call for all workers to be 
treated equally in the workplace, and 
national laws often grant at least some 
political, social, and other rights to all 
residents. Once inside a country, gov-
ernments may have difficulty remov-
ing foreigners who want to stay. 
Policy makers grappling with 
unwanted migration can do little in the 
short-term to reduce demographic and 
economic inequalities, and they do not 
want to roll back communications and 
transportation revolutions. The instru-
ment most readily available to alter 
migration flows quickly is rights, and 
adjusting migrant rights is the policy 
tool often used to deal with migration 
crises.
For example, as welfare rolls 
climbed alongside federal budget defi-
cits, President Bill Clinton pledged to 
“end welfare as we know it.” Immi-
grants loomed large in the 1990s wel-
fare reform debate as some wealthy 
U.S. residents sponsored their elderly 
parents for immigrant visas and, after 
their arrival, enrolled them in welfare 
programs. Children born to unauthor-
ized foreigners in the United States are 
U.S. citizens, and some were enrolled 
in cash assistance and health-care pro-
grams—one factor in California voter 
approval of Proposition 187 in 1994.
Congress debated two broad options 
to deal with immigrants and welfare: 
admit fewer needy immigrants and 
maintain their access to the welfare 
system under the theory that first, 
reduce welfare costs by admitting fewer 
needy immigrants and second, continue 
admitting the same number and type 
of immigrant but restrict their access 
to welfare benefits. Congress elected 
the second option, and denied federal 
welfare benefits to most immigrants 
who arrived after August 22, 1996, until 
they became naturalized U.S. citizens or 
worked in the United States 10 years. 
As a result, 45% of the expected sav-
ings from welfare reforms came from 
denying benefits to the immigrants 
who were 11% of U.S. residents. 
Adjusting migrant rights to manage 
migration generates heated reactions 
from those who advocate a rights-based 
approach to migration. Under this 
theory, all persons in a country have 
fundamental rights by their presence, 
and those employed have the right to 
equal wages and benefits and the other 
entitlements granted to local work-
ers. Many advocates of a rights-based 
approach to managing migration want 
both more international migration and 
more rights for migrants, and do not 
acknowledge any trade-off between 
migrant numbers and migrant rights.
United States
The United States is a nation of immi-
grants. Under the motto “e pluribus 
unum” (from many one), U.S. presi-
dents frequently remind Americans 
that they share the experience of 
themselves or their forbearers begin-
ning anew in the land of opportunity. 
Immigration is widely considered to 
be in the national interest, since it per-
mits immigrants to better themselves 
as it strengthens the United States.
For its first 100 years, the United 
States facilitated immigration, welcom-
ing foreigners to settle a vast country. 
Beginning in the 1880s, certain types 
of immigrants were barred, including 
prostitutes, workers who arrived with 
contracts that tied them to a particular 
employer for several years, and Chi-
nese—beginning an era of qualitative 
Figure 1. Foreign-born Population and Immigrant Share of U.S. Population, 1850–2010
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
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immigration restrictions. In the 1920s, 
quantitative restrictions or quotas were 
added that set a ceiling on the number 
of immigrants accepted each year. 
Immigration law changed in 1965. 
Qualitative and quantitative restric-
tions were maintained, but national 
origin preferences that favored the 
entry of Europeans with U.S. relatives 
were replaced by a selection system that 
favored the admission of foreigners who 
had U.S. relatives or were requested by 
U.S. employers. During the 1970s, the 
origins of most immigrants changed 
from Europe to Latin America and Asia. 
U.S. immigration has occurred in 
waves, meaning peaks and troughs 
(Figure 1). The first wave arrived before 
records were kept beginning in 1820, 
when most of the newcomers were 
English-speakers from the British Isles. 
The second wave was dominated by Irish 
and German Catholic immigrants in the 
1840s and 1850s, and the third between 
1880 and 1914 brought over 20 million 
immigrants to the United States, an aver-
age 650,000 a year at a time when the 
United States had 75 million residents. 
Third-wave European immigration was 
slowed first by World War I, and then 
by numerical quotas in the 1920s.
The fourth wave began after 1965, 
and has been marked by rising num-
bers of immigrants, mostly from Latin 
America and Asia. The United States 
admitted an average 250,000 immi-
grants a year in the 1950s, 330,000 
in the 1960s, 450,000 in the 1970s, 
735,000 a year in the 1980s, and over 
a million a year since the 1990s.
The major immigration debate today 
is what to do about the 11–12 million 
unauthorized foreigners in the United 
States (Figure 2). The Senate approved 
a comprehensive immigration reform 
bill (S 744) in June 2013 that increases 
enforcement to prevent illegal migra-
tion, provides a path to legal immigrant 
status and U.S. citizenship for most 
of the unauthorized foreigners, and 
expands and creates new guest worker 
programs. The House is expected to 
debate bills that would increase enforce-
ment, provide a path for some unauthor-
ized foreigners to immigrant status but 
not U.S. citizenship, and expand and 
create new guest worker programs.
Canada
Canada is an immigration excep-
tion among industrial countries, with 
high levels of immigration, generous 
social welfare programs, and signifi-
cant public satisfaction with immi-
gration policies. Many analysts trace 
this satisfaction to Canada’s point 
selection system that favors the entry 
of young and well-educated foreign-
ers who know English or French and 
have Canadian work experience. 
Canada differs from the United 
States because over half of the legal 
immigrants include a family member 
who achieved enough points to obtain 
an immigrant visa. The point selection 
system ensures that the average educa-
tional level of adult immigrants arriving 
in Canada exceeds the average educa-
tional level of Canadian-born adults. 
Many adult immigrants have college 
degrees, but some cannot find Canadian 
jobs that use their education, resulting 
in brain waste, as when an immigrant 
doctor drives a taxi because he cannot 
obtain a Canadian medical license. 
Canadian immigration patterns 
mirror those of the United States, and 
its policy changes were similar until the 
1970s. For example, the United States 
barred Chinese immigrants in 1882, and 
Canada limited Chinese immigration in 
1885. Immigration to Canada peaked 
between 1895 and 1913, when 2.5 mil-
lion newcomers arrived in a country that 
had a 1913 population of 7 million. 
Canada is a bilingual and multicul-
tural society. The goal of achieving unity 
between English and French speakers 
has been the focus of Canadian poli-
tics for much of the past half-century, 
and many of the policies that make 
Canada a bilingual and bicultural 
society also affect immigration. For 
example, the provinces play a role in 
selecting immigrants, so the Quebec 
government selects immigrants to bol-
ster the number of French speakers. 
Mexico
Until recently, Mexico was Latin Amer-
ica’s major emigration country, send-
ing up to 500,000 people to the United 
States each year. Mexico-U.S. migration 
slowed during the 2008–09 recession, 
and Mexico also became a destina-
tion for migrants from poorer Central 
American countries. Some Americans, 
often Mexicans who have lived in 
the United States, retire to Mexico. 
Mexico-U.S. migration, both legal 
and illegal, remained low until the 
1970s, when the Mexican peso was 
devalued, making higher U.S. wages 
more attractive. Ex-Mexican guest work-
ers, known as Braceros, crossed the 
Source: Pew Hispanic Trends, Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013.
Shaded area represents 90% confidence interval.
Figure 2. Estimates of the U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population, 1990–2012
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border illegally with their relatives and 
friends in the 1970s, and there were no 
penalties on U.S. employers who hired 
them. The stream of Mexican migrants 
turned into a flood in the 1980s, and the 
United States responded with the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(IRCA), which legalized 2.7 million 
unauthorized foreigners—85% Mexi-
cans. IRCA had the unintended conse-
quence of encouraging more Mexicans 
to move illegally to the U.S. in anticipa-
tion of another amnesty and to spread 
Mexicans throughout the United States.
Mexico in 1990 proposed the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). NAFTA lowered trade and 
investment barriers between Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States after 
1994, and was expected to reduce Mex-
ico-U.S. migration as Mexico sent toma-
toes rather than tomato pickers to the 
United States. Instead, there was a Mex-
ico-U.S. migration hump, as increased 
free trade eliminated jobs in Mexican 
agriculture faster than investment could 
create new nonfarm jobs. During the 
late 1990s, as Mexico recovered from 
another peso devaluation and the United 
States was creating 10,000 net new jobs 
every work day, Mexico-U.S. migra-
tion peaked at over 700,000 a year.
Mexico fared better than the U.S. 
during the 2008–09 recession. The com-
bination of improving economic condi-
tions in Mexico and stepped up border 
and interior enforcement in the United 
States slowed net Mexico-U.S. migration 
to almost zero, meaning that as many 
Mexicans returned to Mexico as arrived 
in the United States. The unknown 
questions include whether Mexico-U.S. 
migration will increase again with U.S. 
economic recovery and what effects a 
new U.S. legalization program would 
have on Mexico-U.S. migration patterns. 
Central America, Caribbean,  
and South America
The seven countries of Central America, 
with 44 million residents, sent few 
migrants to the United States until civil 
wars erupted in the mid-1980s. Fighting 
displaced tens of thousands of Guate-
malans, Nicaraguans, and Salvadorans, 
some of whom migrated to the United 
States. The U.S. government initially 
granted asylum to Nicaraguans, who 
were fleeing a government the United 
States opposed, but not to Guatema-
lans and Salvadorans fleeing govern-
ments the United States supported. 
Most Central Americans in the 
United States became immigrants, and 
family unification and unauthorized 
migration followed. Natural disasters 
allowed unauthorized Central Ameri-
cans in the United States to receive 
“Temporary Protected Status” (TPS) so 
they could work legally and send home 
remittances to help in rebuilding. TPS 
has been renewed since, and there are 
there are now large communities of 
Guatemalans, Hondurans, Nicaraguans, 
and Salvadorans in the United States.
The 15 independent Caribbean 
nations and dependencies have 42 mil-
lion residents and some of the world’s 
highest emigration rates, as over 10% of 
persons born in Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Haiti and Jamaica have left—
usually for the United States. Immigra-
tion to the U.S. from the Caribbean aver-
ages 100,000 a year, including one-third 
from the Dominican Republic and one-
sixth each from Haiti, Cuba, and 
Jamaica. 
South America’s 400 million residents 
are two-thirds of the 600 million people 
in Latin America. A century ago, Italians 
and Spaniards migrated to Argentina and 
Brazil and Japanese to Brazil and Peru. 
During the 1990s, some of their descen-
dents of these immigrants returned to 
Italy, Spain, and Japan in search of better 
economic opportunities, but migra-
tion from South America to Europe and 
Japan reversed in recent years, as some 
South Americans abroad returned. 
Conclusions
The number of international migrants, 
people living outside their country of 
birth or citizenship, reached an all-
time high of 232 million in 2013. The 
number of migrants is likely to continue 
increasing because of demographic and 
economic inequalities between coun-
tries, and revolutions in communica-
tions and transportation that enable 
migrants to learn about opportunities 
abroad and travel to take advantage 
of them. Policy makers often react 
to migration crises by restricting the 
rights of migrants, drawing protests 
from advocates who urge a rights-based 
approach to managing migration. 
Every one of the world’s 200 coun-
tries participates in the international 
migration system as a source or destina-
tion for migrants or a country through 
which migrants transit. Many coun-
tries participate in all three ways. Most 
migrants do not move far from home, 
and each of the world’s continents has 
a migration system with unique char-
acteristics, including the large number 
of unauthorized migrants in the United 
States, the point selection system of 
Canada, and high emigration rates 
in many Latin American countries.
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Buffer Zone Regulations and Alternatives to Pre-plant Soil Fumigation: 
Using Steam in California Strawberry Production
Yan Xu, Steven A. Fennimore, Rachael E. Goodhue, Karen Klonsky, and Thomas Miller
California strawberry grow-ers face an increasing number of regulations regarding pre-
plant soil fumigation. Buffer zones 
are required for methyl bromide 
applications under state and federal 
rules, and for chloropicrin applica-
tions under the EPA’s Phase II regula-
tions (implemented December 2012). 
Additional state regulations regarding 
chloropicrin are currently under con-
sideration by the California Depart-
ment of Pesticide Regulation (CDPR). 
Broadly speaking, growers may 
take one of four approaches to buffer 
zone management. First, the buffer 
zone may be left fallow but it will not 
produce any revenue and may incur 
costs, such as weed management costs. 
Second, an alternative crop that does 
not require pre-plant soil fumiga-
tion could be planted, which makes 
the logistics of farming the site more 
complex and less efficient. Third, the 
buffer zone could be planted in straw-
berries even though it is not fumigated. 
This could create a pathogen and pest 
reservoir that would affect produc-
tion in the interior of the field. Finally, 
the buffer zone could be treated with 
a non-chemical alternative that is not 
subject to buffer zone requirements. 
We consider the costs and benefits of 
treating a buffer zone with pre-plant 
soil disinfestation using steam. 
Current Fumigants and Regulations
In 2011 chloropicrin (CP) was used 
on 94% of all pre-plant soil fumiga-
tion of strawberry acreage. Of the 
total acres treated, 51% was treated 
with 1,3-dichloropropene (1,3-D) + 
CP, 33% with methyl bromide (MBr) 
+ CP, 10% with CP alone, 4% with 
metam sodium, and 2% with metam 
potassium, according to CDPR’s Pes-
ticide Use Reporting database.
The December 2012 U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Phase II regulations for CP include 
two sets of buffer zone requirements 
which are on all product labels: buffer 
zones surrounding difficult-to-evacuate 
sites (DES) and general buffer zones 
intended to limit exposure in order to 
protect human health. The EPA defines 
DES as including pre-kindergarten to 
grade 12 schools, state-licensed day-
care centers, nursing homes, assisted-
living facilities, hospitals, inpatient 
clinics, and prisons. For these sites, no 
fumigation with a buffer zone greater 
than 300 feet is permitted within one-
quarter mile, unless the DES is unoc-
cupied for 36 hours following the start 
of the fumigation. For buffer zones 
of 300 feet or less, the minimum dis-
tance from a DES is one-eighth mile.
For the second set of buffer zone 
requirements, EPA selected buffer 
zone distances to protect bystanders 
from exposure to CP. The minimum 
allowable buffer zone distance is 25 
feet. The distances vary based on the 
product applied, the application rate, 
the application block size, applica-
tion equipment and methods, and, if 
applicable, credits for use of emission-
reduction measures such as the use of 
tarps. Table 1 illustrates these differ-
ences by presenting the buffer zone 
distance requirements for the applica-
tion of Pic-Clor 60 at 210 lbs/acre, 
with totally impermeable film (TIF) 
using two application methods, drip 
and broadcast, for four field sizes. 
Activities are restricted in the buffer 
zone from the start of the applica-
tion through a minimum of 48 hours 
after the application is complete. 
All non-handlers are excluded from 
the buffer zone except for purposes 
of transit, including agricultural 
workers not involved in the fumiga-
tion. If the buffer zones overlap, a 
minimum of 12 hours must elapse 
from the end of the first application 
to the beginning of the second. 
In some cases, the buffer can be 
extended outside the treated field so that 
all field acreage can be treated. In other 
cases the buffer cannot extend outside 
the field, which reduces treated acreage. 
We refer to the latter case as a “bind-
ing” buffer zone. In order to provide a 
sense of how much acreage can be lost 
due to binding buffer zones, Table 2 
presents the share of field acreage that 
The number of regulations regarding 
pre-plant soil fumigation is increasing. 
Buffer zones are required for methyl 
bromide and chloropicrin applica-
tions. Choosing application blocks, 
methods, and rates to maximize pro-
fits is becoming a difficult challenge 
for growers. One consideration is the 
management of the buffer zone. We 
consider the costs and returns of using 
steam for pre-plant soil disinfestation 
in a non-fumigated buffer zone. 
Table 1. Buffer Zone Distance by  
Application Block Size and Treatment 
Method
Application 
Block Size 
(Acres)
EPA Buffer 
(feet) for 
TIF Drip
EPA Buffer 
(feet) for TIF 
Broadcast
5 25 30
10 45 64
20 78 92
40 132 158
Pic-Clor 60, 201 lbs/ac, Totally Impermeable Film
Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics  •  University of California10
is part of the buffer and, hence, not 
part of the application block for a range 
of field sizes and buffer distances. 
Possible Responses to  
Buffer Zone Regulations
If the buffer zone distance cannot 
extend outside the field, then the 
grower has an incentive to reduce it. 
One response to the buffer zone regula-
tions that growers could elect to pursue 
is to divide fields into multiple, smaller 
application blocks in order to qualify 
for smaller buffer zone distances. 
Another response would be to treat 
the same ground multiple times using 
lower application rates (and perhaps 
different products) in order to reduce 
buffer zone distances. However, both 
actions would extend the period of 
calendar time required to complete 
pre-plant soil fumigation of the eligible 
acreage. This, in turn, can delay plant-
ing and, ultimately, harvest. On the 
other hand, if a buffer zone can extend 
outside the treated field, there is no 
reason for a grower to reduce the buffer 
zone distance further and increase the 
time required to complete fumigation. 
The extent to which buffer zone 
regulations reduce strawberry acreage 
eligible for pre-plant soil fumigation 
is unknown, but there will be acre-
age losses in some cases. Growers will 
have to manage buffer zones. As noted 
above, there are four basic choices, 
each with its challenges: fallowing, 
planting an alternative crop, planting 
strawberries without fumigating, and 
treating with a non-chemical alterna-
tive to fumigation. We evaluate the 
economic feasibility of pre-plant soil 
disinfestation using steam utilizing data 
from two separate field trials: compar-
ing net returns on a per-acre basis to an 
untreated control, and comparing net 
returns on a per-field basis to fallow-
ing the buffer zone or planting straw-
berries in an untreated buffer zone. 
Economic Viability of  
Steam on a Per-acre Basis 
One of the key determinants of eco-
nomic viability is whether or not 
pre-plant soil disinfestation using 
steam provides effective control of 
pathogens, pests, and weeds. The 
extent of control influences produc-
tion costs and yields. A field trial 
conducted in the 2012–13 growing 
season evaluated steam’s efficacy. 
The trial included four strawberry 
varieties. Different genetic stock may 
have different levels of tolerance for 
important pests and pathogens, which 
in turn, can affect the efficacy of pre-
plant soil disinfestation using steam. 
The varieties included the University 
of California variety Albion and three 
proprietary varieties—referred to as 
P1, P2, and P3 here. Two treatments, 
steam and steam + mustard seed meal 
(MS), were applied to each variety and 
each variety had an untreated control.
Results show that the treatments 
provided effective control. These results 
were then used to evaluate the eco-
nomic returns for the two treatments. 
Net returns were calculated using 2010 
Sample Costs to Produce Strawberries, 
cost information regarding the steam 
applicator (Table 3), and price data from 
the USDA Agricultural Marketing Ser-
vice. The average shipping point price 
for California nonorganic strawberries 
for flats containing eight 1-lb. contain-
ers was $9.99 during the trial period. 
Net returns are reported in Table 4. 
Of the four strawberry varieties, P1 had 
the highest net return for both treat-
ments and the control. Comparing the 
treatments, steam yielded the highest 
return for each strawberry variety. How-
ever, net returns varied considerably 
across the four varieties. This compari-
son suggests that growers who are con-
sidering using steam to treat buffer acre-
age should consider the performance of 
varieties when soil is treated with steam, 
rather than fumigants, prior to planting. 
Additional analysis confirms that 
the net revenues of the treatments are 
sensitive to the strawberry shipping 
point price, fuel price, and the speed of 
the steam applicator. A higher shipping 
point price, lower fuel price, and faster 
applications generate higher net profits. 
The relative importance of variations in 
these factors depends on yields. Higher 
yields generate a larger effect on net 
Table 4. Net Revenues per Acre
Steam Steam+ 
MSM
Control
Albion  $7,381  $5,395  -$5,231
P1  $10,109  $9,464  -$1,296
P2  $9,349  $8,838  -$3,979
P3 -$2,308 -$4,820  -$4,430
Price to Operator  $207,717 
Application Rate  15.5 hrs/ac 
Equipment Life  7 years 
Annual Capital Recovery Cost  $35,573 
Annual Repairs  $4,154 
Annual Steam Machine 
Cost/Treated Acre
 $253
Table 3. Steam Applicator Cost Estimates
Table 2. Buffer Zone Acreage and Share of Field Acreage in Buffer Zones 
Field Size 
(acres)
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Buffer 
Zone 
Width
Buffer 
Zone 
Acres
Percent 
of Field 
Acres
Buffer 
Zone 
Acres
Percent 
of Field 
Acres
Buffer 
Zone 
Acres
Percent 
of Field 
Acres
Buffer 
Zone 
Acres
Percent 
of Field 
Acres
25 0.3 5% 0.4 4% 0.5 3% 0.8 2%
50 0.5 11% 0.6 8% 1.1 5% 1.5 4%
100 1.1 21% 1.5 15% 2.1 11% 3.0 8%
200 2.1 43% 3.0 30% 4.3 21% 6.1 15%
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revenues for any given change in price.
The non-treated control had 
negative returns for all varieties. This 
result suggests that planting strawber-
ries on untreated buffer zones may 
not be economically attractive. 
Buffer Zone Steam Treatment  
for a Fumigated Field
Apart from its per-acre performance, 
steam can affect total returns to a field 
by increasing net revenues, as well as 
providing better control of pests and 
pathogens in buffers that cannot be 
fumigated prior to planting. We illus-
trate this possibility using the example 
of a 20-acre square field. Where permit-
ted by regulation, the field is treated 
with Pic-Clor 60 (56.7% of CP and 
37.1% of 1,3-D) through drip applica-
tion at the application rate of 250 lbs./
acre with totally impermeable film.
As reported in Table 1, this treat-
ment requires a 78-foot buffer. In the 
example, the buffer zone is entirely 
within the field on one side, so that 
only 18.33 acres may be fumigated 
and the 1.67 acres in the buffer zone 
may not. Data regarding weed con-
trol and yield for steam, Pic-Chlor 60, 
and an untreated control are from a 
2010–11 trial near Watsonville, CA. 
We compare the field-level net 
returns for three options for manag-
ing the buffer zones: fallowing, plant-
ing strawberries without any pre-plant 
treatment, or planting strawberries 
using steam for pre-plant soil disinfesta-
tion. Results are reported in Table 5.
Treating the buffer with steam 
prior to planting strawberries results 
in higher net revenues for the field 
than not treating the field—approxi-
mately $1,000 or around 10% of net 
revenue. Planting strawberries results 
in field-level net revenues that are 
higher than fallowing. The benefit from 
steam over untreated and/or fallow in 
the buffer zone for any given field is 
greater as the buffer zone increases. 
Conclusion 
The increasing number and complex-
ity of use regulations and associated 
label restrictions regarding pre-plant 
soil fumigation increases the challenges 
associated with managing pest and dis-
ease pressure in an economically viable 
way. Effective buffer zone management 
is one such challenge. Pre-plant soil dis-
infestation using steam is one method 
that can enhance field-level returns 
for California strawberry production 
when buffer zone requirements prohibit 
fumigating some portion of a field. 
The use of steam for pre-plant soil 
disinfestation extends beyond straw-
berry production. Organic produc-
ers can incorporate it into their pest 
management programs. Much of Cali-
fornia’s flower production occurs on 
small fields close to urban areas, even 
more than in the case for strawberries, 
so steam can be a part of that indus-
try’s response to increased regulation 
as well. Similarly, there is interest in 
using steam for golf course renovation. 
More broadly, the development 
of new technology takes years. The 
regulatory environment is changing 
much more rapidly. The economi-
cally viable uses of steam will almost 
certainly increase as the technology 
continues to be improved and regu-
lations become more stringent. 
Buffer 
Treatment
Field-level  
Net Revenue
Steam  $10,799 
Untreated  $9,752 
Fallow  $5,312
Table 5. Net Revenues by Buffer Zone 
Treatment: 20-acre Square Field,  
78-foot Buffer on One Side
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